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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between patenting, innovation,
and federal antitrust enforcement towards firms in the manufacturing sector. I examine whether
the likelihood of antitrust litigation is influenced by patent histories and R&D expenditures, after
controlling for other firm-specific variables including size and likelihood of antitrust charges for







The American judiciary in the nineteenth century deprecated monopoly, but celebrated the
grant of property rights in patents.1 Judges did not recognize patents as monopolies,
arguing that patentees added to social welfare through innovations which had never existed
before, whereas monopolists secured to themselves rights that already belong to the public.2
The passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 was associated with a populist emphasis on the
need to protect the public from corporate monopolies, including those based on patent
protection.3 Numerous lawsuits, articles and books since then have debated whether
antitrust policies, which are designed to suppress monopolization, are antithetical to policies
that grant exclusive property rights in inventions.
Researchers who support the hypothesis of a conflict typically describe antitrust
lawsuits and identify the large number which seem to hinge on patent issues or to involve
corporations regarded as technological leaders. The roster ranges from landmark cases in
the early decades of the 20th century, such as those against American Tobacco, John Deere
& Co., American Can and International Harvester, through to the numerous cases since
1970 against prominent innovators such as IBM, Xerox, Eastman Kodak and, most recently,
Intel and Microsoft.4 Some of the studies in this vein claim that antitrust officials have
evinced "almost unbroken hostility towards patents."5 Others warn of the possibility of
obtaining static (antitrust) gains at the expense of dynamic (technological) efficiency.6
Proponents of the "no conflict" view specify distinctions between the justifiable
exercise of patent power and unjustifiable misuse that is subject to antitrust action;
countercite other cases upholding patent rights in the context of antitrust charges; or else
2point to the lack of supporting evidence.7 Ward Bowman refuted the notion of a conflict
on conceptual grounds, arguing that the objective of both policies is to increase social
welfare by providing consumers with the most goods at the lowest cost.8 Federal antitrust
agencies have likewise contended that there is 'no basic incompatibility or irreconciliable
conflict between the patent laws and the antitrust laws," because both have the objective of
promoting competition and enhancing social utility.9The question of conflict is easy to
dismiss in specific circumstances such as patent misuse and fraud. For instance, in Pfizer
v. FTC 394 U.S. 920 (1969), it was found that Pfizer and American Cyanamid had deceived
the Patent Office and used the patent property to engage in monopolization of the
tetracycline market.Similarly, the FTC challenged a 1998 merger between Summit
Technologies and VISX because of patent misuse, and proposed that a key VISX patent
should be overturned.'0 Plaintiffs in antitrust disputes can also bring charges based on
'predatory innovation" that has the objective of eliminating competition." However, such
cases involve clearly unacceptable practices associated with patent ownership, and do not
bear on questions such as whether technological innovators may legitimately gain market
power associated with patent ownership, and thus increase the likelihood that complaints
against them are filed under antitrust laws.
This study considers the question of whether greater technological innovativeness is
associated with closer scrutiny by antitrust enforcement agencies. Specifically, I examine
whether technological innovation influences the probability of an antitrust action. Case
studies and theoretical insights are important and informative, but the issue of the
relationship between patent and antitrust enforcement is only partially illuminated by these
3methods. Although quantitative data are likely to exhibit other limitations, a systematic
assessment of antitrust charges over time at least provides another perspective that may
shed some light on the patent-antitrust debate. Despite the voluminous literature on
antitrust litigation and its relationship to intellectual property, most empirical work has been
directed towards other antitrust issues and few towards the patent-antitrust interface.
Richard Posner made an important contribution in 1970 when he presented simple
descriptive statistics regarding overall historical trends in antitrust enforcement at the
industry level. Some researchers have used his industry level data to examine the
determinants of antitrust activity, and, apart from sales, found a negligible relationship
between economic factors and numbers of charges brought across industries.'2 This is
hardly surprising, since antitrust charges are brought against firms, and not against
industries. Other studies have analyzed specific antitrust violations such as price fixing and
mergers, or on the political economy of federal agencies such as the FTC.'3
This paper therefore presents an empirical analysis of the patent-antitrust issue in
the manufacturing sector between 1970 and 1998. I investigate the influence of innovation
on the likelihood of federal government antitrust charges, controlling for firm specific
factors such as firm size, sales growth and advertising intensity. It should be noted that the
underlying concern is not so much to ascertain whether there is an inherent or actual
patent-antitrust conflict. Rather, this study recasts the debate by considering whether
innovative firms that engage in high levels of patenting or research and development
antitrust are more likely to be engaged in federal antitrust litigation. I also assess an
example, in the area of R&D joint ventures, where antitrust policy appears to have
4influenced the rate and direction of inventive activity.
The first section of the paper summarizes aggregate trends in antitrust litigation
initiated by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice between 1970
and 1998. The second section describes a dataset of firms that were involved in federal
restraint of trade lawsuits and a control sample that form the basis for subsequent analysis.
The third section examines patterns of patenting and innovation at the firm level, and
relates these patterns to variation over time, firm characteristics, and interindustry effects.
The data are then used to assess whether innovativeness in the form of R&D and patenting
tends to increase the likelihood of antitrust charges within a given industry, after controlling
for other variables that might affect the tendency to antitrust scrutiny. The final section
discusses whether antitrust policy has influenced firm behaviour, by considering patterns of
filing of joint ventures in research and development, under the National Cooperative
Research and Production Act which provides limited relief from antitrust sanctions.
Clearly, if finns with more extensive patent portfolios experience a greater likelihood
of antitrust scrutiny, it holds serious implications for the future of the patent system.
Significantly, sanctions under the patent law are far less stringent than those of antitrust:
patentees who are charged under antitrust law may face treble damages,forced divestures
and compulsory licensing, compared to the simple invalidation of the patent grant under
patent laws. Thus, if firms perceive that higher patenting isassociated with a higher
likelihood of antitrust charges, a rational response would be to reduce the propensity to
patent, and to attempt to appropriate returns outside of the patent system.It should be
noted that this study is not intended to prescribe whether optimal policy should be directed
5towards strengthening antitrust enforcement or towards furthering the rights of patent
holders.However, legal rules are unlikely to be wealth-maximizing if they create
inconsistent incentives, so the results bear implications for both federal industrial and
intellectual property policies.
II. AGGREGATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND THE ANTITRUST DATASET
The major antitrust statutes --theSherman Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Clayton
Act, Hart-Scott-Rodino Act --havethe basic objective of regulating business and controlling
firms which engage in anticompetitive practives, in order to promote social welfare. Figure
1 shows all antitrust cases, both federal and private, filed in U.S. district courts between
1975 and 1997. Both series reveal a precipitous drop in total district court filings, but the
share of government lawsuits increased somewhat after 1985, partly because of more
stringent requirements that the courts imposed on private litigants. I chose to focus on
federal government litigation in this study, because the rationale for private antitrust
litigation is likely to be more difficult to disentangle and interpret. Moreover, private
actions may be related to government charges, as in cases where private plaintiffs use
federal complaints as a signal to free-ride on federal investigation expenditures and to try
to obtain damages or injunctive relief from alleged harm that the federal defendant may
have caused competitors.14
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) do not

























ij, CoN-Co O 0 — N ) '-It) CON- Co0) 0 — N ) U)(0N-
N-N-N-N-N. Co Co Co Co Co Co Co Co
0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)
—0-— Private — Government
Notes:The figure includes total antitrust cases filed in U.S. district courts. U.S.
government cases include both civil and criminal charges, in which the government
was either plaintiff or defendant. Source: Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Annual Report of the Director, various years [Washington, DC, USGPO].analysis. Instead, these data must be retrieved from the CCH Trade Regulation Reports.
The Reports typically include several entries relating to one action, some of them listed
across several years. The Federal Trade Commission reports summaries of cases inthe
"FTC Docket of Complaints" of The Trade Regulation Reports. The Dockets are not veiy
informative, comprising the name of the firm, frequently the good produced, and the
charges. I concatenated these FTC complaints to obtain a list of distinct actions for each
firm. Similary, I compiled the aggregate DOJ information by individual action from 1970
through 1998, categorizing the cases by four-digit SIC code, and noting the issue, outcome
and year of decision when that could be traced. Once the sample was assembled, I obtained
further information about individual cases from the TRADE library of Lexis/Nexis. The
resulting data set can be used to track broad changes in federal antitrust litigation and
policy over time and industry, although the focus of this paper is primarily on the influence
of patenting on antitrust litigation.
Between 1970 and 1993 the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed 1293 charges.'5 The
majority of cases related to allegations of bid-rigging in the construction industry, with
numerous defendants listed in each charge. In keeping with its stated mission, the DOJ's
second priority is the prosecution of price-related restraints of trade. Almost one half (47
percent) of all non-bidrigging charges deal with pricing issues, especially the per se illegal
criminal price-fixing cases which tend to be charged and summarily decided in the same
year. In contrast, the 1673 FTC consent decrees predominantly involve false advertising and
deceptive business practices.16 The more economically based investigations address issues
relating to mergers, pricing and restraint of trade actions. Some have argued that the work
7of the two agencies is largely duplicative, but agency employees indicate that they engage
in a division of labour by industry. The consent decrees support this, since the DOJ's cases
focus on construction, the service sector, food, chemicals and the petroleum industries. The
VFC historically charged firms in textiles and financing (such as credit collection
companies), but the agency has recently increased litigation against firms in software,
computers, and high technology, and has sponsored hearings on global and innovation-based
competition.'7
From these aggregate data I selected my antitrust sample, which comprises all
manufacturing firms that were primary defendants in general trade restraint charges filed
by the FFC and DOJ between 1970 and the present.'8 Figure 2 illustrates the time series
of federal antitrust complaints that I compiled as a subset of the aggregate data described
above. The antitrust sample totals approximately 500 companies involved in 547cases,and
excludes those charged with "noneconomic" antitrust torts such as deceptive advertising and
misleading trade practices. This number was reduced to 426 actions against publicly traded
firms that were included in the Compustat files, in order to obtain a time series of financial
data such as income, balance sheet and stock market values. The antitrust charge specified
the product market that was the subject of the action, so it was possible to allocate each
charge to an industry at the four-digit SIC level. Each firm in the antitrust sample was then
matched by 4-digit SIC code and the year in which the lawsuit was filed with a control firm














Notes: See text for description of sample, which includes charges filed by the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division.III. PA! 1ERNS OF INNNOVATION
In order to better understand the link between antitrust and innovation, this section relates
R&D and patenting to firm level characteristics and to industrial composition.19 The
"Schumpeterian hypothesis" is typically characterized as proposing a positive relationship
between firm size, industry concentration, and innovation.20 In the antitrust dimension,
this model implies that innovative enterprises may attract antitrust attention because they
are more likely to be dominant or large relative to the industry. The concentration of
patenting in large corporations has long been noted, and designated the "monopolization
of patent monopolies."2' Fritz Machlup felt that patent policies by large firms assured
them of "almost unlimited monopoly power." These statements are based on the view
that patents serve to create and preserve market power through barriers to entry, especially
since patenting around the invention and patent litigation by potential entrants can be costly
and risky strategies. Acs and Audretsch tested a modification of the usual Schumpeterian
model and found that large firms tended to have a innovative advantage in capital intensive,
concentrated, and advertising intensive industries, whereas smaller firms had a comparative
advantage in very innovative industries, and in more competitive markets. Some contend
that such research findings highlight the need to strengthen antitrust laws to deal with large
patent portfolios. For instance, it has been suggested that antitrust laws should inhibit firms
from accumulating large stocks of patents through policies such as a progressive tax.
Others have supported the introduction of requirements such as compulsory patent licensing
or working the patent, under the guise of antitrust policy, although historically both the
courts and the makers of U.S. patent policies have resisted imposing restrictions on the
9rights of the owners of intellectual property.
In order to examine the relationship between patenting and antitrust, it is useful to
first of all consider the types of firms that engage in patenting. Since there is high variance
in the annual numbers of patents issued to a firm, I use instead the accumulated stock of
patents assigned to the finn in the five years up to and including the year of the antitrust
charge. These included patent holdings by firms such as General Electric (4378 patents
between 1977 and 1981), Westinghouse (1923 between 1981 and 1985), Dow Chemical (1894
between 1983 and 1987), and Alliant Techsystems (82 patents, 1990 through 1994). The
simple statistics presented in Table 1 are consistent with other studies using patent data and
are consistent with the 'Schumpeterian hypothesis." The data indicate that patenting varies
positively with firm size in the antitrust sample as well as the control sample. Patenting by
antitrust firms is significantly higher across all size categories, both in terms of levels and
relative to total assets and sales. However, the summary statistics in Table 1 also indicate
that the antitrust firms tend to be much larger than the control sample. This reflects the
significance of large size (and hence of market share) in motivating antitrust lawsuits: in
some concentrated industries (such as automobiles and rubber tires) it was difficult to find
any firms which had existed in the same period and had not been charged with antitrust
violations after 1950. However, one might be concerned about selection bias in the control
sample. In order to indicate how sensitive the results are to differences in size the analysis
reported below allows coefficients to vary across firm size. I also tested the robustness of
the results by redoing the analysis after eliminating from the dataset the top 100 firms in
terms of size.
10TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: ANTITRUST AND MATCHED SAMPLE
ANTITRUST MATCHED
Means Means
LARGE FIRMS (N=110) (N=5)
Patents 881.41 27.00
R&DIntensity 0.026 0.005
Advertising Intensity 0.009 0.001




Intangible/Total Assets 0.061 0.006
Sales Growth 0.151 0.156
Profit 0.056 0.056
Capital Intensity 0.095 0.060
Total Assets (real) 21717 7609
MEDIUM FIRMS (N=175) (N=50)
Patents 137.1 55.82
R&D Intensity 0.202 0.012
Advertising Intensity 0.022 0.006




Intangible/Total Assets 0.048 0.029
Sales Growth 0.143 0.115
Profit 0.059 0.046
Capital Intensity 0.083 0.084
Total Assets (real) 2261 1287
SMALL FIRMS (N=114) (N=332)
Patents 55.14 9.371
R&D Intensity 0.019 0.013
Advertising Intensity 0.016 0.020




Intangible/Total Assets 0.056 0.036
Sales Growth 0.148 0.033
Profit 0.058 0.012
Capital Intensity 0.075 0.067
Total Assets (real) 228 131TABLE 1 (CONT'D)
ALL FIRMS ANTiTRUST MATCHED
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Patents 318.9 767.8 15.60 45.93
R&D Intensity 0.022 0.041 0.013 0.032
Advertising Intensity 0.017 0.035 0.017 0.051
Excess Market Valuation 1.396 1.002 1.244 0.840
Intangible Assets 517.35 2020.24 8.020 27.72
Intellectual property
litigation 37.54 70.79 3.14 6.47
R&D=0 Dummy 0.331 0.471 0.589 0.493
Intangible/Total Assets 0.054 0.096 0.034 0.070
Sales Growth 0.140 0.291 0.049 0.477
Profit rate 0.058 0.054 0.019 0.302
Capital Intensity 0.085 0.060 0.069 0.051
Employees 60.946 120.72 5.156 10.83
Total Assets (real) 7638 17995 458 1146
Number of Firms 426 405
Notes and Sources: see Appendix for definition of variables and sources.The smaller antitrust firms have a greater patenting intensity relative to total assets
and to research and development than the larger antitrust firms. Both large and medium
antitrust firms tend to have higher research and development and advertising expenditures
relative to total assets and sales compared to the control sample, whereas smaller firms in
both samples were more similar in these dimensions.Medium and small firms also
reported similar physical capital intensity across samples, but the antitrust firms are
characterized by higher levels of intangible assets relative to total assets, have higher sales
growth, and greater profitability. The control firms tended to have lower excess market
valuations (ratios of market value of the firm to total assets that proxy for Tobin's Q), which
may be interpreted as a crude measure indicating lower market power. The record of
higher intellectual property litigation for antitrust firms is somewhat ambiguous, since it may
reflect higher valued patents, or greater competitiveness in defending or enforcing the firm's
intellectual property. The latter might be related to anticompetitive strategies, but the
negligible simple correlation (Table 2) between the proxy for market power and litigation
does not support the idea that intellectual property litigation is related to market
dominance.
Figure 3 is consistent with the idea that antitrust firms are more innovative with
regard to patenting compared to the general population of firms, since their record of
average annual patent grants is consistently higher. Although there is still a lot of noise in
the time series of average annual patents granted, a declining trend was followed by a recent
surge in patents granted to antitrust firms charged in the 1990s. This could be due to the
increase in the importance of technology-intensive industries relative to total economic
11TABLE 2
CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS
ANTITRUST AND MATCHED SAMPLES
VARIABLES ANTITRUST MATCHED
Log(Patents)
Excess Market Valuation -0.015 0.124*
IP Litigation 0.531* 0.583*
Capital Expenditures Ø•4Ø7* 0.139*
Capital Invested 0.402* 0.185*
R&D Intensity 0. 196* 0.283*
Sales Growth 0.017 0.068
Advertising Intensity -0.073 -0.060
Advertising Intensity
Excess Market Valuation 0.214* 0.013
Profit Rate 0.125* 0.619*
R&D Intensity 0.066 -0.019
R&D Intensity
Excess Market Valuation 0.214* 0.462*
Profit Rate -0.050 -0.075
IP Litigation 0. 128* 0.106*
Intellectual Property Litigation
Profit Rate 0.098* 0.012
Excess Market Valuation 0.044 0.077
Excess Market Valuation
Profit Rate 0.200* 0.220*
Sales Growth 0. 192* 0.040
Notes:
*= significantat least at the 1 percent level.












Notes: The horizontal axis refers to the year in which the antitrust charge was filed,
and the data series reflect the log of total patents granted to firms in each sample.
For further information on the samples, see the text.
—Antitrust —0—Matchedoutput, or to greater antitrust attention being paid to firms or industries that are more
innovative. The former hypothesis seems more plausible since the matched sample
experiences similar patterns in patenting. Because firms are matched by industry, these data
reveal within industry variation in antitrust activity rather than intermdustry differences.
However, Table 3 indicates an increase in the number of firms charged with antitrust
violations in the chemical, pharmaceutical, computer and machinery, and professional and
scientific equipment industries, industries which are generally regarded as more
technologically innovative. In order to explore the relationship between patenting and
antitrust, it is useful to further examine the factors that influence patenting at the firm level.
Table 4 reports the results of OLSregressionswith the log of the five year patent
stock as the dependent variable. Patenting shows a downward trend, and is significantly
higher for larger firms and for firms that were involved in antitrust. However, apart from
size, none of the market power variables is significant. Separate regressions for firms of
small, medium and large size (not reported) indicate that much of the patenting by smaller
firms appears to be non-firm specific, for only 10 percent of variation in their patenting is
explained by the independent variables, compared to 55-66percentfor medium firms.
Higher research and development is associated with higher patenting, with significantly
positive coefficients on current R&D and the second R&D lagged term (although the
significance of the second term falls when total assets is included), suggesting that patents
in these firms may tend to arise early in the development stage. The relationship between
patenting and R&D appears to be non-linear, since the coefficient on the squared R&D
term is positive and significant. However, the latter result does not hold when the
12TABLE 3
INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PATENTS GRANTED
INDUSTRY ANTITRUST MATCHED
1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s1980s 1990s
Motor vehicles and
transportation equipment 425522 516 32 18 9
(18)(8) (8) (17)(8) (8)
Drugs and chemicals 413 418363 25 10 4
(27)(22)(23) (25)(20) (20)
Communicationequipment 423 804775 37 18 15
(17)(10)(9) (17)(9) (9)
Food and kindred products 96 20 66 6 1 1
(41)(14)(11) (42)(13)(9)
Lumber and paper products 35 90 300 16 2 0
(17)(5) (1) (16)(5) (1)
Machinery 343 1130506 88 39 9
(11) (8) (16) (10) (8) (12)
Metals 91 40 95 14 3 2
(25)(10) (4) (25)(9) (8)
Petroleumrefining and extraction 434200476 1 3 0
(12)(8) (6) (12)(8) (6)
Prof. & Scientific Equipment 27872 972 35 34 5
(9) (4) (10) (9) (4) (10)
Rubber, stone, glass, plastics 91 40 1251 11 2 35
(25)(10)(4) (25)(8) (3)
Textiles 89 9 13 0
(12)(2) (12)(2)
Miscellaneous 50 30 68 3 3 7
(9) (5) (2) (8) (5) (2)
All Industries 225 329480 20 11 7
(224)(105)(98) (57)(30)(18)
18 Standard Deviation 516 711 1137 57
Min=0; Maximum= 457343787429 555 250 105
Notes:
Patentfigures refer to the average number of patents granted to firms within the five years up toand including the




Dependent Variable: LogofPatent Stock
(1) (2) (3)




Log(R&D) 0.42*** Ø•43*** 0.36***
(5.13) (4.36) (4.44)
Log(R&D,one lag) 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.10) (0.07) (1.25)
Log(R&D, two lags) -0.05 0.03 0.10
(0.61) (0.78) (1.26)
Log(R&D) Squared 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(3.02) (2.56) (2.44)
Log(Total Assets) O.23*** 0.24*** 0.30***
(5.33) (4.82) (6.73)
Antitrust dummy 0.56*** 0.50" 0.55***
(3.73) (3.18) (3.74)




Proxy for Tobin's Q 0.06
(0.82)
INDUSTRY EFFECTS












Professional equipment 1.08 ***
(3.91)
Food -0.24
N 657 603 657
R2 0.63*** 0.60 0.66***
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses. *indicatessignificance at the 5 percent level;
M''indicatessignificance below 5 percent level. See Appendix for industrial composition. The antitrust dummy
has a value of 1 for antitrust sample, 0 for control.TABLE 4 (cont'd)
OLS REGRESSIONS: DETERMINANTS OF PATENTING
(2) ANTITRUST AND CONTROL SAMPLES
Dependent Variable: Log of Patent Stock
(1) (2)







Log(R&D, one lag) 0.03 0.02
(0.26) (0.15)




Log(Total Assets) 0. 19*** 0.40***
(3.49) (5.90)
INDUSTRY EFFECTS


















Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses. *indicatessignificance at the 5 percent level; 'K
indicatessignificance below 5 percent level. See Appendix for SIC composition of industry dummies.regression is estimated over antitrust firms alone. It is interesting that the R&D coefficients
are more important for the control sample, probably due to greater variation across the
non-antitrust firms unobserved by measurement error.
As is generally found, firms in the chemical, metal, automobile, computer and
communications, and professional equipment industries experience higher patenting relative
to those in traditional industries such as lumber, paper products, food and textiles, but
industry effects do not add much explanatory power to the equation. The second part of
the table reports regressions that allow coefficients to vary across both samples. As
suggested by the simple statistics, the total assets or firm size elasticity of patenting is twice
as high for the antitrust firms. Interindustry differences in patenting are evident across the
samples, since companies in the control sample operating in the petroleum, automobile,
computer and communications, chemical and pharmaceutical industries are not particularly
prolific in terms of patent ownership. In sum, these results are consistent with the idea that
antitrust firms tend to be larger and more innovative than other members of their industry
who were not the subject of antitrust charges. The next section considers whether the
likelihood of antitrust litigation varies with the degree of innovation.
IV. ANTITRUST AND INNOVATION: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Previous sections presented data and cases that indicate an increase over time in the
importance of federal government antitrust charges relative to private cases. The recent
attention of federal agencies to high technology firms also raised the possibility that the
significance of patent/antitrust issues has increased since 1970. An examination of simple
13statistics on patenting seems to suggest that firms with higher patenting records are more
likely to face charges of violating antitrust laws. However, these findings did not control for
other factors that might influence antitrust litigation, such as profitability, advertising, and
size of the firm. Therefore, in this section I use the firm level dataset described above to
present multivariate analyses of factors that may influence the probability that a corporation
will be involved in antitrust litigation. The major hypothesis being tested is whether firms
with higher patenting profiles are more likely to experience antitrust litigation after
controlling for other factors that might influence antitrust scrutiny.
Official reports by the federal antitrust agencies correctly point out that firms have
rarely been charged directly with antitrust violations based on patent issues. However, the
pattern in Figure 4 suggests that the issue is worth exploring further. The data were
obtained from a search of the Lexis-Nexis federal lawsuits files (GENFED/OMNI) and
include both private and federal government antitrust cases. I selected all lawsuits in which
the words patent and antitrust occurred at least six times as an index of patent-antitrust
cases, and computed the ratio of this index to all cases in which "antitrust" appeared at least
six times (the patterns are not especially sensitive to the frequency chosen). The figure
suggests that there was a decline in the importance of patent and antitrust issues until the
middle of the 1970s, and a sharp increase thereafter until at least 1993. This is consistent
with the fact that, at the same time that patent legislation guarded the rights of patentees
against infringing competitors, a number of landmark restraint of trade lawsuits that
involved technological innovators were being brought in these years.27












Notes:See text for details.
Figure 4
N '* CD0 N t CD CD
N.N. N Nsize of firm. The dependent variable is a binary variable which has a value of 0 if the firm
had not been involved in an antitrust case since 1950, and 1 if the firm had been charged
by federal agencies between 1970 and the present. Coefficients are interpreted asthe effect
of a one unit change in the independent variable on the log of the odds of antitrust
litigation. I use the log of R&D and patent stock to investigate the relationship between
innovation and antitrust. Interestingly, research and development expenditures do not affect
the likelihood of an antitrust action being brought against the firm, which suggests that
innovative inputs are not as important as outputs such as patents, perhaps because the
impact on market share of engaging in R&D is negligible or not discernible!
Antitrust ruling regarding patent stocks is quite clear: "Mere accumulation of patents,
no matter how many, is not in and of itself illegal," United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). United Shoe was found guilty because of its
questionable business practices, not because of its extensive patent holdings. In the absence
of anticompetitive behaviour, we should therefore find no relationship between patent stocks
and the likelihood of antitrust charges. However, the patent stock coefficient is consistently
positive and significant, and is likewise not sensitive to outliers, nor to variations in the
sample size or time period. Given the relationship between firm size and patenting, it is
important to control for the former, and several different specifications were tried. When
we control for firm size the magnitude of the patent coefficient falls noticeably, but the
variable remains statistically significant across all alternative specifications.29
The regressions also attempt to control for the influence of intangible assets and of
market power through a number of proxies. Capital intensity and accounting measures of
15TABLE 5
LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANTITRUST LITIGATION
(1) ALL FIRMS
Dependent Variable: 0 if control, 1 if antitrust litigation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 25.90 42.78 45.93 39.90 58.22
(1.63) (2.70) (2.34) (1.70) (3.24)
Year 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.03*
(1.47) (2.97) (2.87) (2.15) (3.84)
Log(Patent Stock) 0.57*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.20***
(175.01) (12.85) (8.32) (10.57) (7.18)
Log(Total Assets) 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.81***
(99.84) (78.46) (63.60) (64.16)
Log(R&D) 0.47 -0.13 -0.14
(0.07) (0.37) (0.47)
Log(R&D, one lag) -0.01 0.12 0.04
(0.07) (0.23) (0.02)
Log(R&D, two lags) -0.02 -0.03 0.17
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
R&D=0 dummy -0.03 0.03 -0.13
(0.01) (0.01) (0.24)
Log(Advertising Expenditures) 0. 20'' 0. 20"
(5.27) (4.91)
Sales Growth 1.52*** 1.15
(6.59) (3.45)
Proxy for Tobin's Q 0.28***
(4.72)
N 786 658 658 658 604
Chi2 249.0 349•5*** 349 7*** 349.1*** 318.8***
Notes: Wald Chi-squared statistics are in parentheses. *indicatessignificance at 5 percent level; ***indicates
significance below 5 percent. See Appendix for definition and source of variables.TABLE 5 (cont'd)
LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANTITRUST LITIGATION
(2) BY SIZE OF FIRM
Dependent Variable: 0 if control, 1 if antitrust litigation
—
SMALLFIRMS MEDIUM FIRMS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 84.62 77.01 113.80*** 6.78 3.14
(3.87) (3.01) (5.58) (0.01) (0.00)
Year -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01
(4.29) (0.02) (6.08) (0.06) (0.03)
Log(R&D) 0.31 0.21 0.18 —0.23 -0.52
(1.72) (0.41) (0.57) (0.43) (1.84)
Log(R&D, one lag) -0.10 -0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03
(0.12) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(R&D, two lags) -0.26 -0.31 -0.31) 0.19 0.28
(1.31) (1.61) (1.62) (0.59) (1.09)
R&D=0 dummy -0.23 -0.21 -0.26 -0.03 -0.37
(0.54) (0.46) (0.64) (0.00) (0.37)
Log(Patent Stock) 0.07 0.10 0.05 O.33*** 0.36***
(0.48) (0.79) (0.24) (7.56) (7.99)
Log(Total Assets) 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.91*** 1.24*** 1.24***
(22.50) (16.95) (19.52) (16.74) (13.67)
Log(Advertising) 0.12 0.10 0.41***
(0.65) (0.51) (6.27)
Sales Growth 1.50*** 1.00 1.43
(4.54) (1.77) (1.41)
Proxy for Tobm's Q Ø44*** 0.20
(7.40) (0.47)
N 318 308 298 225 207
Chi2 47.0*** 49.0 53.8*** 444*** 52.9***
Notes: Small firms have total real assets below $500 million; medium firms between $500 and $1000 million; large firms
above $1000 million. Wald Chi-squared statistics are in parentheses. *indicatessignificance at 5 percent level; ***
indicatessignificance below 5 percent. See Appendix for description and source of variables.intangible assets were not influential, and thus are not included in the reported regression.
A standard proxy is advertising expenditures, which are positively related to the likelihood
of antitrust charges. Firms with faster growth in sales are also more likely to be the subject
of antitrust investigations. Rapid sales growth and excess market value may signal the
presence of market power through innovation or in the form of rents to firm-specific assets.
The results indicate that firms with higher sales growth and excess market values are more
likely to be involved in antitrust, although the inclusion of both variables reduces the overall
explanatory power of the regression.
The relationship between antitrust and innovation might vary depending on
interactions between independent variables and firm size, but inclusion of interaction terms
reduces the reliability of estimates because of collinearity. The second section of the table
therefore shows separate regressions for smaller firms (those with real total assets below
$500 million) and medium firms (assets between $500 million and $1000 million). Similar
patterns to those reported above hold for medium firms, except for the lack of influence of
sales growth on the likelihood of antitrust charges. Patenting by smaller firms is not related
to antitrust involvement (although this result only holds for a subset of this class).30
Advertising intensity is also not influential, but smaller firms with faster sales growth or
higher excess market values are more likely to attract antitrust attention.
If it is indeed true that innovative or successful enterprises face a higher likelihood
of antitrust litigation, one might expect that such firms would respond by changing the rate
and direction of their inventive activity. This is a difficult issue to determine empirically,
but some evidence is available in the area of R&D alliances. Thus, the next section provides
16another perspective on the relationship between antitrust policies and innovation. For, it
examines the filing of research joint ventures and concludes that innovative businessesseem
to perceive and even overestimate the likelihood of charges or convictions under antitrust
laws.
V. COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND ANTITRUST
The National Cooperative Research Act (1984) and the National Cooperative Research and
Production Act (NCRPA, 1993) were approved because policy makers were concerned
about the role of antitrust in the declining competitiveness of Americantechnology relative
to foreign firms that seemed to benefit from research consortia.31 Commentators explicitly
opined that technological innovation would be enhanced if collaboration in R&D
endeavours were freed from the inhibition of possible antitrust liabilities, andpointed to
longstanding Japanese and European laws which grant such joint ventures antitrust
exemptions. Thus, the NCRPA was "designed to promote research and development,
encourage innovation, stimulate trade, and make necessaiy and appropriate modifications in
the operation of the antitrust laws."32Theacts clarified the antitrust implications of R&D
joint ventures, and offered relief from costs and fees in unsuccessful antitrust actions. They
also recommended the application of the rule of reason to all jointventures, although the
incremental benefit of such a provision is arguably minimal relative toexisting policy.
Further, joint ventures that filed a notification with the antitrust agencies were sheltered
from the recovery of treble damages in private and state antitrust lawsuits, becausethe
17statute limited liability in such cases to single damages. These modifications were
apparently motivated by the "overdrawn yet real perception in the business community that
the antitrust laws generally discourage all collaborative activity."33 This section considers
the membership of NCRPA joint ventures that registered with the DOJ, and is based on
unpublished reports that the DOJ presents annually to the Committee on the Judiciary.
A total of 609 joint ventures were filed with the DOJ between 1985 and 1996. Of
these, 124 joint R&D ventures were formed between 1985 and 1988, and some 200 ventures
registered between 1988 and 1993. Approximately 250 R&D cooperative associations
registered under the 1993 statute between June 1993 and 1996. The most recent report for
1996 to 1997 indicates that 63 new R&D joint ventures registered over the period, while 55
existing ventures updated the status of their membership or activities. Thus the NCRPA
has been associated with rapid growth in the formation of research consortia and/or the
propensity to register these associations formally to obtain lower private antitrust damages.
The responsiveness of innovative firms to a statute that in effect only offers protection from
treble damages seems to suggest an extremely high perceived probability of charges and
conviction incident on participation in joint ventures. The number of filings with the DOJ
is therefore consistent with the idea that businesses perceive some degree of conflict
between antitrust and innovation.
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for a cross-section of joint ventures filed in
three years, which was assembled as part of a separate and more detailed study of the
effects of the NCRPA. European joint ventures tend to be concentrated in the high
technology areas of chemicals, biotechnology, information technology and new materials
18TABLE 6
CHARACTERISTICS OF NCRPA MEMBERSHIP
INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION
Industry Number of Percent Number of Firms Percent
Joint Ventures
Chemical, Medical
& Pharmaceutical 13 12.5 92 5.9
Computers 23 22.1 866 55.2
Energy and Power 15 14.4 119 7.6
Electronics and
Related Durables 13 12.5 153 9.8
Motor Vehicles 18 17.3 191 12.2
Telecommunications 6 5.8 46 2.9
Other 16 15.4 100 6.4
TOTAL 104 100.0 1567 100.0
TYPEOF FIRM Number Percent
Foreign firms 298 19.0
University and
other Non-Corporate 110 7.0
U.S. Corporations 1159 74.0
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS IN SAMPLE
Region Number of Firms Percent





FEDERAL ANTITRUST INVOLVEMENT OF NCRPA SAMPLE
Sample Antitrust Percent involved
No. Firms No. Firms in Antitrust
Chemical, Medical
& Pharmaceutical 26 6 23.1
Computers 46 16 34.8
Energy and Power 28 10 35.7
Electronics and 24 5 20.8
Related Durables
Motor Vehicles 18 8 44.4
Telecommunications 9 1 11.1
TOTAL 151 46 30.5
Notes: From Annual Reports on R&D joint venture filings, DOJ (unpublished, various years). The
sample comprises two firms from each venture that filed in three randomly selected years. Antitrust
involvement relates to federal government charges.technology. In this country, the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers
Association had been a strong advocate for the passage of the NCRPA legislation. It is
therefore not surprising that the sample of joint ventures is dominated by the large number
of firms that participated in research alliances related to the computer industry (both
hardware and software). The majority of these NCRPA firms were American corporations
from the Midwest region (in consortia largely related to automotive research) and the West,
although the DOJ reports participation by representatives from over 30 foreign countries.
A number of joint ventures included partnerships between universities and corporations,
such as the 1996 'Blue Band II Consortium" to develop semiconductor laser diodes, which
included among its members Hewlett Packard, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, SDL mc,
Boston University, MIT, and the Universities of New Mexico, Texas, and Utah.
It is undoubtedly true that firms collaborate in research for a number of reasons
besides antitrust considerations. For instance, they may benefit from complementarities in
knowledge and other inputs, from economies of scale, the internalization of spillovers, risk
sharing and access to other markets. However, these are reasons for engaging in shared
endeavours rather than for registration with the federal antitrust agencies. It is possible to
gain some insight into the link between antitrust enforcement and the tendency to register
joint R&D activities by considering the antitrust history of member firms. I therefore
analyzed the federal antitrust records of a random sample of member firms that filed under
the NCRPA. As Table 6 indicates, almost one third of the sample had been charged with
antitrust violations by either the DOJ or the FTC. Hence, the perception by innovative
businesses that collaborations would likely attract antitrust scrutiny may not be greatly
19"overdrawn" given their past experience.
Antitrust agencies and federal courts over the years have undoubtedly modified their
attitude towards technologically motivated alliances in relation to trade restraint.34
Nevertheless, there have been several prominent cases recently of firms jointly charged with
antitrust violations that are linked to patent based market power and to concerns about
"innovation markets".35 This is most clearly shown in the prominent role that patents and
R&D have played in recent mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act, administered by
the FTC.TheFTC challenged the proposed Roche and Genentech merger in 1990 and
required Roche to license its patents on therapeutics for growth hormone deficiency to third
parties. Similarly, in 1994 the VFC was troubled by the technological implications of a
merger between Sensormatic Electronics and the Knogo Corporation, both of which
produce electronic surveillance source labels to protect against shoplifting.36 The two firms
planned to grant each other royalty free cross-licences and to share trade secrets. The FTC
claimed that the agreement would lessen competition, and the market was unlikely to attract
entry "because of patent protection for important technology and the time required to
develop the requisite technical skills to compete." Moreover, the merger would serve to
"increase the likelihood that firms in the relevant market will restrict output of research and
development both in the near future and in the long term." The consent decree prohibited
Sensormatic from acquiring patents belonging to Knogo, and imposed a ten year ban on
Sensormatic's purchasing similar patents. The Sensormatic case treated patented
technologies as products, without considering the increase in net social welfare that might
accrue if firms formed joint ventures for the purpose of sharing knowledge and expertise,
20and avoiding duplicative efforts.
The majority of current patent-antitrust cases arise in the context of proposed
mergers and acquisitions, rather than in the context of predatory behaviour or per se illegal
actions. Consent decrees in these cases typically require a combination of technology
divestures, compulsory licensing, and even the forced sharing of trade secrets to ensure that
competitors are able to acquire the capability to effectively use the technology.37 In Wright
Medical Technology, the VFC ordered the firm to transfer patents, trade secrets and
business know-how related to orthopaedic finger implants to the Mayo Foundation.38 The
agency further stipulated that the latter should be able to sublicense these assets in
perpetuity, and that Wright Medical was then required to provide technical assistance to the
Mayo sublicensee (a future competitor of Wright).
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of interactions between patenting, innovation and antitrust enforcement has
generated a longstanding debate typically supported by references to case studies. This
paper was motivated by the marked lack of empirical attention paid to the issue of patenting
in relation to antitrust actions brought by federal government agencies. I outlined patterns
of aggregate antitrust activity, which indicated a fall in both private and government
antitrust litigation, but an increase in the relative importance of government actions. A
rough estimate of the frequency of patent-antitrust interactions suggested an increase since
1970, which could be due to the greater economic importance of technology intensive
industries, or to greater government scrutiny of innovative firms. It seems plausible that
21firm specific effects would explain a greater part of the variation in antitrust charges than
industry effects, so my sample was constructed to examine within-industry variation.
The major finding of the empirical analysis is that patent stocks are associated with
higher likelihood of antitrust charges for medium and larger firms. Smaller firms with faster
sales growth, possibly an index of greater success, are also likely to sustain greater antitrust
litigation. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that innovative, successful
enterprises are more likely to garner antitrust attention, especially since recent FTC rulings
express concern about protecting competition in the "market for innovation". These findings
may also explain the previous reluctance of firms to engage in research alliances because
of fears of antitrust charges. However, the results do not control for other elements of firm
strategy that might be correlated with patenting behaviour and sales growth. For instance,
the evidence on intellectual property litigation could be taken as an indication that
innovative firms might be more aggressive in their pursuit of market share. Such firms
might also have a greater tendency to engage in anticompetitive behaviour.
Additional research could be directed towards providing more information on the
nature of the charges brought, since the implications of the findings would differ in the case
of (say) merger challenges relative to price fixing charges. In further work I intend to
consider directly the nature of antitrust cases that involve patent issues, and to examine the
antitrust and innovation implications of NCRPA filings more extensively. It would also be
interesting to exp]ore differences in innovation policies between the FTC and DOJ. For
instance, I conducted interviews with officials at both agencies whose comments implied that
the FTC is more likely to bring a charge at the instigation of market rivals (it was argued
22that private firms can at times act as surrogate Attorneys General), whereas the DOJ selects
cases that are likely to be economically important and precedent setting.
23APPENDIX
A. DEFINITION AND SOURCE OF VARIABLES
VARIABLE DEFINITION
R&D Intensity Compustat R&D/Total Assets
Advertising Intensity Compustat Advertising Expenditures/Total Assets
Capital Intensity Compustat Capital Expenditures/Total Assets
Profit Rate Compustat Net Income/Total Assets
Real Total Assets Total Assets deflated by Producer Price Index, 1982=100
Sales Growth Compustat Sales variable; one year and two year growth
Small Firms Real Total Assets below $500 million
Medium Firms Real Total Assets between $500-$1000 million
Large Firms Real Total Assets above $1000 million
Excess Market Valuation [(Current Assets -CurrentLiabilities +LongTerm Debt) +
(CommonStock Outstanding*Price of Stock +Preferred
Stock)]/Total Assets
[All variables from Compu stat]
Intellectual Property
Litigation Searches by firm in Lexis/Nexis (PATENT/IPOMNI) for total
count of lawsuits involving patents, trademarks or copyrights.
Patent Stock Patents granted to firm in five years prior to antitrust
charge. Source: Patent Office Gazette for patents filed before
1971, the IBM Patent Searcher website for 1971-1975, and
Lexis/Nexis (PATENT/UTIL) for patents 1975-1998.
NCRPA Firms Annual reports provided by the Department of Justice, 1986
through 1997 (details regarding membership in research joint
venture under the National Cooperative Research and
Production Act). The sample of firms comprises two members
that were randomly chosen from each venture for the years 1987,
1996 and 1997; thus small ventures are over-represented.
Antitrust Firms See text for sources.
24B. CONTROL SAMPLE
The antitrust sample was randomly matched by year and 4-digit SIC code with a control
sample. Each antitrust firm was allocated to an industry based on the product market that
was the subject of the antitrust charge. Hence, the product market was not necessarily the
firm's main line of business. I obtained a list of firms on Compu stat that were in that
product market in the same year as the charge. Next, these firms were checked against
antitrust records on Lexis/Nexis, and those that had been involved in federal antitrust
actions in the previous twenty years were eliminated. The final filter was to exclude those
firms for which Compustat did not have any data for the years in question.
C. STANDARD INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATIONS
INDUSTRY SIC GROUPS
Automobiles & other transportation 37
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 28
Communications equipment 36, 4810, 4811
Food 20
Lumber and paper products 24, 25, 26





Misc 2111, 2121, 3480, 39
Textiles 22, 23
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